Battle of Baghavard
Safavid Empire |combatant2= Ottoman Empire |commander1=Nader |commander2=Köprülü Abdullah Pasha |strength1= 15–18,000'Axworthy, Michael(2009). ''The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 203. I. B. Tauris (main body of 40,000 never engaged)Ghafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now,p. 383. Etela'at Publishing |strength2= '80,000'Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 114. Osprey Publishing *50,000 Sipahi cavalry *30,000 Janissary infantry *40 cannon |casualties1= 'negligible'Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 203. I. B. Tauris |casualties2= '''40–50,000 killed & woundedAxworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 203. I. B. Tauris 32 cannon captured }} The Battle of Baghavard also known as the Battle of Morad Tapeh was the final major engagement of the Perso-Ottoman War of 1730–1735 where the principal Ottoman army in the Caucasus theatre under Koprulu Pasha's command was utterly destroyed by only the advance guard of Nader's army before the main Persian army could enter into the fray. The complete route of Koprulu Pasha's forces led to a number of besieged Ottoman strongholds in the theatre surrendering as any hope of relief proved ephemeral in light of the crushing defeat at Baghavard. One of Nader's most impressive battlefield victories, in which he decimated a force four or five times his own, it helped establish his reputation as a military genius and stands alongside many of his other great triumphs such as at Karnal, Mihmandoost or Agh-Darband. Background On November 3, 1734 Nader arrived at the gates of Ganja after subduing Shirvan by capturing its capital Shamakhi in the August of 1734. The fortifications of Ganja so impressed Nader that he decided on a protracted siege of the city so leaving behind a portion of his force around Ganja he set of with the remainder towards Georgia and Armenia in the west, besieging Tiblisi and Yerevan respectively. Abdollah Koprulu Pasha exited Kars with an army of 50,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry plus 40 guns in order to find and bring Nader's main force to battle with the purpose of lifting the sieges of Ottoman holdings in the region. When news of Koprulu Pasha's entrance into area via crossing the Arpachay river the Armenian chronicler Abraham of Crete records Nader's reaction as being "praise be to god, I had been awaiting this moments for such a lengthy time" and immediately set out to meet him with his advance guard of 15–18,000. That night Nader camped on a high ground overlooking the plain nearby a forest. Battle s, forcing the Ottomans back 3. Nader at this point signals his hidden contingent of troops from the nearby forest to flank the disorganized Ottomans, helping to completely route them off the field]] Hearing of Nader's proximity as well as the meagreness of his numbers Koprulu Pasha Hastened his approach. Nader, instead of falling back towards the main body of the Persian army started to deploy his advance guard on the spot. Battle commenced at 2 o'clock in the afternoon with Nader having deployed a contingent of troops in the nearby forest, he led 3,000 men down onto the valley below beginning a skirmish with the Ottomans to fix their attention. The Turks who were in the process of deploying a significant number of their guns on the crest of a small hill were caught completely off guard when Nader in an aggressive manoeuvre dispatched 2–3,000 of his elite musketeers (the Jazayerchi) to seize the hill. The Ottomans were driven off the hill and their precious artillery pieces were captured causing great dismay among Ottoman soldiers who witnessed the ease with which their guns fell into enemy hands in just the opening phase of the battle.Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant, p. 202. I. B. Tauris Nader at this moment sent forward another unit in order to neutralise the other concentration of Ottoman artillery on the left, after which the order for the advance of the centre was given. Nader's own artillery was augmented by the presence of 500 zamburaks (which were essentially swivel guns mounted on the back of camels, providing light manoeuvrable artillery). Although zamburaks were extremely vulnerable to cannon fire, all of the Ottoman guns had been silenced allowing the zamburaks to play a decisive role in the battle. Now the Persian artillery came into play supporting the centre's advance into the heart of the Ottoman line by a murderous volley of round shot in addition to the a half thousand zamburaks that now unleashed a devastating fire on the Ottoman centre which having been thrown into disarray subsequently fell back as the Persians centre closed on them. In all, the Persian cannon fired over 300 rounds not including the zamburaks while the Ottoman guns fired a pathetic two or three times before being silenced for the remainder of the battle.Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 114. Osprey Publishing At this crucial juncture, with the Ottoman centre thrown back and reeling in confusion, Nader summoned his contingent of troops hidden away at the edge of the nearby forest to settle the matter decisively by converting Koprulu Pasha's withdrawal into a headlong route. Nader put himself at the head of 1,000 light horsemen to seal the path of retreat on his foe. Koprulu Pasha was set upon during the route by a Persian soldier by the name of Rostam who threw him from his horse, knocking him unconscious just prior to beheading him and taking the morbid trophy back to camp presenting it to Nader. Many other high-ranking generals were also slaughtered and their troops faired even worse, being pursued and butchered all the way back to Arpachay river. The massacre of the Ottoman soldiery was such that Nader himself later wrote (with little exaggeration) that "we made a butchery of all the Janissaries; not a single one of them could make away with his life" and that "an overwhelming number of the Ottoman cavalry... almost all of them were killed by the grace of god".Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant, p. 203. I. B. Tauris The rapidity of the Ottoman collapse as well as the ease with which their guns were captured (suggestive of the possibility that they had not deployed supporting troops to guard them yet) all strongly indicate that the Ottoman army had not fully formed up, probably because of the small array of Persian troops in front of them, they mistakenly thought that they would not be engaged until the main body had arrived. Nader recognizing this opportunity, did not await the arrival of the rest of his army and shocked the Ottomans by descending down on them with merely his advance guard catching them (quite probably) in mid-deployment and sealing their fate with a perfectly timed flank attack by a masterfully concealed detachment of troops hidden away at the edge of a nearby forest. (In some regards the battle could be said to have some vague similarities with Oda Nobunaga's battle of Okehazama). Aftermath The defeat at Baghavard was so crushing that scarcely 8,000 soldiers made their way back to KarsGhafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now,p. 383. Etela'at Publishing out of the original number of 80,000 while Persian casualties were minuscule. In many ways it was the perfect battle to the end of one of the most tumultuous wars between the two superpowers where advantages were gained and then lost in an almost perpetual shift of fortunes. Nader himself, writing to the prince of Gulytsin, claimed "never in any of my wars have I been as fortunate"Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 204. I. B. Tauris and was content enough to order a monument to be built on the high ground which he had set up camp the night prior to the battle. The strategic ramifications of the battle were felt almost immediately throughout the Caucasus with Ganja and Tiblisi surrendering in despair though Yerevan held out until Nader, crossing the Aparchay river blockaded Kars and the Ottomans were convinced to exchange Yerevan for the lifting of the blockade on October 13, 1735. Events in Europe Emboldened by the disastrous defeats of the Ottomans at the hands of Nader and seizing on the pretext that an army of Tatars had violated the sovereignty of Russia by marching along the black sea coast to join Koprulu Pasha against Nader's forces they soon after entered into military operations against the Ottoman empire eventually capturing Azov. Austria also chose this moment to simultaneously join in a war against Istanbul, however they did not share their Russian ally's success on the field suffering a catastrophic defeat at Grocka. Nader Marches North After his most successful campaign to date Nader lingered on appointing new governors to his newly acquired cities and kingdoms before setting out against the Lezgians in northern Daghestan. The Tatars who had marched all the way from Crimea, on receiving news of Koprulu Pasha's demise as well of that of his army, turned and hastened back north along the black sea coast. The Lezgians however proved an altogether much tougher foe especially with the advent of the winter snow in the tight restricted mountain passes of northern Daghestan. The Lezgian leader was defeated in June 1736 and fled to the Avars with many of his subjects making peace with Nader.Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 206. I. B. Tauris Having largely pacified the Caucasus he left for Persia where he would overthrow the Shāhanshāh and establish his own dynasty. See also *Siege of Ganja *Ottoman–Persian War (1730–35) *Caucasus Campaign (1735) *Treaty of Ganja *Treaty of Constantinople References Sources *Moghtader, Gholam-Hussein(2008). The Great Batlles of Nader Shah, Donyaye Ketab *Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant, I. B. Tauris *Ghafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now, Etela'at Publishing *Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 114. Osprey Publishing Category:Conflicts in 1735 Category:1735 in the Ottoman Empire Category:Battles involving the Ottoman Empire Category:Battles involving the Safavid dynasty